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I present an economic model of insider trading building upon Haddock
& Macey’s classic analysis of trading by the manager of a Coasian firm
(i.e., a firm in which agency costs do not exist). Due to current sharehold-
ers’ status as expected sellers of shares, Coasian insider trading allows
shareholders to expropriate outsiders via the managerial proxy and any
signaling value of insider trading is eliminated by shareholders’ biased in-
centives. Adverse selection results. If a system of credible disclosure exists,
an insider trading ban results in more disclosure, more efficient prices, and
lower illiquidity costs. While the case for insider trading in the Coasian
firm may be weak, insider trading can provide positive social benefits
where some form of agency cost exists. Insights from the Coasian model
include that shareholder incentives may lead to undesirable capital markets
activity, greater agency costs may result in preferable social outcomes, and
deterrent penalties must take into account shareholder incentives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
TEXAS Gulf Sulphur1 is notable for, among other things, the policyposition that insider trading is not fundamentally different frominformed trading by outsiders. In its boldest interpretation, as sub-
sequently developed and interpreted by the SEC, Texas Gulf Sulphur
would prohibit both insider and outsider informed trading, even where
the outsider’s information does not “emanate[ ] from a corporate source
nor . . . deal with a corporate issuer or its affairs.”2 How and why such a
view developed—and ultimately came to be rejected—is the subject of
other work (including in this volume).3 From a welfarist perspective,
though, a consideration of Texas Gulf Sulphur fifty years later requires
revisiting the justification (or lack thereof) for equal treatment of inside
and outside information: is there a reason to allow one but not the other?
As one might expect, prior literature has already explored this question
at some length. The economic analysis of insider trading to date has re-
volved around two principle theoretical frameworks: market effects,4 and
agency.5 The market effects critique considers primarily the effect of in-
1. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
2. Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Robert H. Mundheim & John C. Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 802 (1973)
(citation omitted).
3. Professor Langevoort describes the development and ultimate rejection of that
view and attributes it to practical concerns of enforcement and the day-to-day workings of
the capital market, which is largely run by market professionals who seek to make in-
formed outsider trades. See Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella:
A Tale of Two Duties, 71 SMU L. REV. (2018). Providing a contrasting view, Professors
Macey and Haddock attribute the modern development of insider trading prohibitions,
which allow outsider trading relatively unfettered, to regulatory capture by market profes-
sionals who view inside traders as unwelcome competition. See David D. Haddock &
Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an Application
to Insider Trading, 30 J. OF L. & ECON. 311, 314–17 (1987) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey,
Private Interest].
4. On the market effects front, there is no intrinsic reason to believe that insider
trading and informed trading by outsiders serve markedly different functions. From the
perspective of the hapless liquidity trader or market-maker, it does not matter whether one
loses to an insider as opposed to an informed outsider. The insider’s advantages—cheaper
and more accurate information—are not necessarily socially bad since they may allow
price efficiency to occur at a lower overall cost. The market effects analyses that argue
against insider trading have mostly focused on potential anti-competitive effects. Profes-
sors Fishman and Hagerty, for instance, propose a model in which inside traders can drive
out informed traders owing to their informational advantage, leading to less efficient stock
prices. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency
of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. OF ECON. 106, 113 (1992). However, the price efficiency result
persists only under certain conditions, and even then it is unclear whether the overall social
welfare effects are positive or negative: While prices are less efficient, informed traders
spend less on deadweight research costs. See, e.g., id. at 110 n.6, 112–15. Others have fo-
cused on the lack of competition insider traders face. See generally Nicholas L. Georgako-
poulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and
Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
5. The agency cost literature has focused on how bad, exactly, are agency costs and to
what extent are private contracts able to remedy them. Coasianists, such as Manne, Had-
dock & Macey, assert that firms could prohibit insider trading if they wished (such as by
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sider trading on market efficiency and liquidity. The inside trader is
treated as a sort of informed-trader-on-steroids, whose information is
cheaper, more timely, more accurate, and perhaps less subject to compe-
tition than outside information traders. The agency critique focuses on
the manager’s flawed relationship with the firm, asking the question:
what might a disloyal manager do in order to maximize her insider trad-
ing profits? These arguments are ably summarized in prior literature,6 but
suffice it to say that the conclusions have been mixed.
The contribution that I offer here bears mostly on the agency critique.
There is a general consensus that the worse agency costs and the greater
impediments are to complete contracting between shareholders and man-
ager, the greater the case becomes for banning insider trading.7 The point
of the instant article is to explore why that is not actually true, at least as
a general proposition.
As a point of departure, I utilize the Haddock & Macey model of a
Coasian firm, whose shareholders choose whether or not to allow insider
trading.8 I take the assumption of the Coasian firm to the logical ex-
treme:9 the manager does what the shareholders want, all the time, only
subject to the shareholders’ willingness to bankroll the activity. There are
no agency costs, and it is almost as though the shareholders are piloting
the manager by remote control. In such a case, insider trading becomes
entirely unworkable.
The reason is that shareholder incentives are not benign—certainly not
when it comes to the prospect of selling shares to outsiders. The firm’s
charter amendment) and that insider trading opportunities may provide valuable incen-
tives that are otherwise difficult to formulate by contract. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCKMARKET 138–41 (1966); see also Haddock & Macey, Private In-
terest, supra note 3. Those arguing against insider trading claim the opposite: Insider trad-
ing is beyond the ability of shareholders to control or cabin, enforcement is difficult or
impossible, and insider trading exacerbates agency costs by unwinding compensation in-
centives and distorting managerial behavior. See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, The Legal The-
ory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 47,
47 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991).
6. Professor Beny, in particular, provides an excellent summary. See Laura Nyantung
Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribu-
tion to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 241–56 (2007).
7. “The debate about whether private contracting is more efficient than government
regulation of insider trading is closely related to the debate about whether insider trading
is efficient.” Id. at 256; see also id. at 252–57 (describing the Coasian debate over the extent
of feasible contracting and its effect on insider trading).
8. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trad-
ing, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1986) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model].
9. I use the term “Coasian firm” in a sense similar to that in which Haddock & Macey
do: The firm provides the ability to contract efficiently among the firm’s stakeholders (for
present purposes, the manager and the shareholders). My version of the Coasian firm is
somewhat more extreme. As will be seen, I assume, for instance, that the manager’s trades
can be as large as shareholders may desire, and that no informational leakage occurs from
the firm that the shareholders do not desire. Note, however, that the model is not generally
Coasian, in the sense that efficient contracting between the firm and outsiders (such as
market professionals) is not allowed. Thus, it is assumed infeasible to have such efficient
niceties as a pre-commitment by the firm not to engage in fraud or other manipulative
conduct.
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current shareholders—the ones who decide firm policy at any place and
time—are the firm’s complete owners, and any sales of shares must come
from them. They thus stand in the position of sellers and have the incen-
tives of sellers—namely, to make sales at as high a price as possible.10
Where the manager acts merely as the shareholders’ proxy, we have, in
effect, the combination of inflationary incentives and asymmetric infor-
mation that leads to adverse selection (the familiar “lemons problem”) in
other sales contexts. Via the manager, the shareholders externalize trad-
ing losses and other costs onto outside parties and hence engage in in-
sider trading strategies without regard to whether those strategies are
socially efficient. Further, the potential signaling role of insider trading is
undercut by shareholders’ inflationary incentives; the shareholders’ de-
sire and ability to exploit the signal to their own advantage eliminates the
signal’s credibility.
These findings have implications for scholarship, law, and policy. They
suggest that the focus on eliminating firm agency costs as a proxy for
maximizing social welfare is not correct, at least with regard to capital
markets activity.11 The fact that insider trading could serve malign share-
holder ends implies that placing responsibility on shareholders may be
appropriate, and possibly the optimal liability strategy.12 Further, since
shareholder incentives to manipulate prices are large, the requisite deter-
rents will be increasingly large as agency costs decrease. Finally, in terms
of a direction for scholarship, the dramatic effect of corporate governance
on the desirability of insider trading indicates that there is much yet to be
gained from models that integrate corporate governance and capital mar-
kets activity in the spirit of the original Haddock & Macey analysis.
II. THE HADDOCK & MACEY MODEL: COASIAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
INSIDER TRADING
Three decades ago, in the golden age of law and economics, Professors
Haddock & Macey proposed an elegant model of integrated firm govern-
ance and insider trading.13 The gist of their argument was that in a rea-
sonably well-run firm (what they call a “Coasian firm”), shareholders
10. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
11. This is, of course, not a new point. Historically, there existed significant skepticism
over shareholders as proxies for social welfare. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 492–96 (2012). The
more recent view has been to view shareholders as the residual claimaint on the firm and
hence in the best position to promote efficient production, which may be significantly re-
lated to social welfare. See id. at 497.
12. This is also not a new point. The same period of time as the Haddock & Macey
analysis gave rise to a significant and sophisticated literature on the efficiency of vicarious
liability. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 128–31 (1987).
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpo-
ration, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the
Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345
(1982); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L. J. 1231 (1984).
13. See Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model, supra note 8.
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would only allow insider trading when it benefits them. This suggests that
the practice may not be socially undesirable, particularly since sharehold-
ers appear to internalize much of the costs and benefits. In the model,
insider trades occur against the shareholders themselves. When the man-
ager buys shares, the counterparty is a shareholder. When the manager
sells, she sells short, and the counterparty is a shareholder.14 Under such
assumptions, the costs of insider trading are largely, if not entirely, borne
by the firm’s shareholders.
At the same time, the shareholders in a Coasian firm also bargain with
the manager over the wage. As is customary in economic principal-agent
models, the manager commands a market wage; under assumptions of,
say, competitive pressure to bargain for the manager’s job, the manager
will, in expectation, receive exactly the market wage. What does this
mean for insider trading? If the manager enjoys expected utility from in-
sider trading, this utility will allow the wage to be lower, saving the share-
holders money. Under assumptions of risk neutrality, whatever profits
the manager takes are completely rebated to the shareholders, at least in
expectation.
In total, the shareholders bear the costs of losing to the manager on her
inside trades, yet they have the benefits of the trades rebated back to
them. This should be a wash, unless inefficiencies crop up. The main inef-
ficiency that Haddock & Macey propose is managerial risk aversion, al-
though any friction that makes the managers gain less than the
shareholders’ trading losses ought to suffice. Based on just this model so
far, these inefficiencies, if they exist, are internalized, and shareholders
ought to allow insider trading only when it is not inefficient.
That is not, however, the end of Haddock & Macey’s analysis. Suppose
that if the manager does not take advantage of the inside information, it
is subsequently discovered by outsider traders (what we might commonly
call in such models “informed traders,” who research in order to gain an
informational advantage in trading). If the manager is risk-averse (or his
trading is otherwise costly), it may be that a more socially efficient out-
come is to allow outside, informed traders to take advantage of what
would otherwise be the manager’s inside information. So, for example, if
the manager is risk-averse but the outsiders are risk-neutral, letting the
trading opportunity go to the outsider expropriates shareholders, but
does so efficiently. It is just a transfer, and so, from a Kaldor-Hicks per-
spective, is neutral.
Notwithstanding social efficiency, shareholders would not like this.
What had formerly been the manager’s profits, some fraction thereof be-
ing rebated to the shareholders, have now become outside traders’ prof-
14. See id. at 1461. Note that the assumption that the insider always trades against
current shareholders cannot be correct. Possibly Haddock & Macey considered that the
purchaser of the shares ultimately becomes a shareholder. However, the current share-
holders and future shareholders may be largely different, and it is doubtful any particular
shareholder will have his successor shareholder’s interests at heart.
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its, with no rebate whatsoever back to the shareholders. Shareholders in
such an instance would choose to allow insider trading even if it was
inefficient.
Does this militate toward a mandatory ban on insider trading instead of
letting shareholders make their own decisions? Not quite. In the first
place, it may be that shareholders, instead of outsiders, are next in line
after managers to appropriate insider information opportunities. If so,
shareholders would themselves prohibit insider trading if it were ineffi-
cient. Second, the fact that investors differ in their ability to exploit infor-
mation—i.e., which investors would be next in line to use the
information?— suggests endogeneity in terms of who will be a share-
holder. In particular, an insider trading ban would lead to the firm’s
shares being exclusively owned by informed traders. Ordinary run-of-the-
mill (noise-trading) shareholders would face constant threats of expropri-
ation with each trade, and hence would exit the market, leaving it to
those with better expropriative capabilities.15
This latter result does not sound good. With a ban, the average Joe no
longer has a place at the table in the U.S. securities markets—or else can
only maintain parity by placing his money, for a fee, with a professional
money manager who can undertake precautions against expropriation by
better informed traders. Such defensive action constitutes deadweight
precaution costs, a form of inefficiency; and of course, there are distribu-
tional consequences in that small investors may lose out. In contrast, even
if insider trading creates some inefficiencies, it has positive countervailing
effects for small investors who can now stand their ground against the
informed traders by trading, in effect, via their managerial proxy. The net
effect of insider trading could be positive.
Thus, in sum, Haddock & Macey’s elegant argument suggests that in-
sider trading is a relatively cost-efficient way for shareholders to protect
themselves from expropriation by informed outside traders. Insider trad-
ing is both a product of, and tool for maintaining, good corporate govern-
ance by small and dispersed investors.
However, as with any model, no matter how ingenious, there are ques-
tions that arise as we add complexities to it. This Article now takes up
some of these questions. To begin, is it realistic to assume that the man-
ager can only trade with shareholders as opposed to outsiders? If not,
then trading losses are not necessarily internalized, and shareholders may
not make efficient choices. Further, in a truly Coasian firm, we might
imagine that the manager is simply a proxy for the interests of sharehold-
ers. Would that not be equivalent to every shareholder being a construc-
15. This is an extreme result. A more middle-of-the-road result would occur if, as is
commonly thought, there are also exogenous, non-information-based reasons for trading
(i.e., noise trading). For example, if investors purchase securities because they have cash
inflows and desire the expected return (better than leaving it in the bank), or if investors
sell securities because they have sudden needs for cash, then some noise-trading investors
may continue to trade in the firm’s shares.
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tive insider? And, in such a context, are shareholder incentives good?
These considerations, as shown below, will have serious consequences.
III. EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS WITH A
FULLY COASIAN FIRM
In this Part, I expand upon the Haddock & Macey framework with a
few twists. Specifically, I change three major assumptions in the model.
First, I relax the assumption that the manager always trades against the
firm’s shareholders. Second, I consider the shareholders’ own trading in-
centives: the firm’s current shareholders themselves are, in expectation,
going to be net sellers of the firm’s shares in the future. Third, I allow the
firm to be fully Coasian in the sense that the manager acts loyally to max-
imize current shareholders’ well-being, and I allow a broader set of activi-
ties than do Haddock & Macey.
The players in this model consist, on the firm side, of its manager and
its shareholders. It is assumed that shareholders and the manager may
strike a private,16 but binding, arrangement among themselves. In effect,
the manager acts perfectly loyally and in the best interests of the firm’s
current shareholders. As is conventional in liquidity models, outsiders
consist of three types of traders: informed traders (who may research in
order to learn about the true value of the firm); noise traders (who trade
for reasons exogenous to the model, such as sudden demand for, or an
excess of, cash); and market makers (who act as intermediaries for all
trades and impose a bid-ask spread). These three types of outside market
participants create the familiar dynamic of illiquidity costs that arise from
informational uncertainty.17
The question of interest is the shareholders’ strategic choice of whether
and how to allow the manager to engage in insider trading. As it turns
16. This is a point of departure from the Haddock & Macey model, in which con-
tracting is done via the charter and is observable. Whether the shareholders’ choice is
observable or not has potentially significant bearing on the outcome: A public commitment
might allow coordination and overcome Prisoners’ Dilemma-type problems, whereas a pri-
vate or ex post choice may not. In general, I will assume that “good” corporate oversight
entails enough ongoing discretion by shareholders or their representatives that choices are
made unobservably and without precommitment. For instance, the board could, in the in-
terests of shareholders, renegotiate the managers’ compensation contract, grant more
stock, or otherwise enable or limit insider trading in ways not immediately apparent to
outsiders. In actual practice, it does not appear to be the case that public companies bind
themselves to a particular compensation scheme via the corporate charter, and instead
boards of directors retain substantial discretion in rewarding or punishing corporate
executives.
17. In the standard liquidity model of Copeland & Galai or Glosten & Milgrom, the
possibility of expropriation by better informed traders leads market makers to impose a
bid-ask spread. See generally Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the
Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. OF FIN. 1457 (1983) [hereinafter Copeland & Galai]; Lawrence R.
Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with
Heterogenously Informed Traders, 14 J. OF FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) [hereinafter Glosten &
Milgrom]. The costs of the spread are borne by noise traders, which may include the firm’s
shareholders. Informed traders expend deadweight research costs and make trading prof-
its, market makers break even in expectation from the imposition of their spread, and
noise traders fund the informed traders’ profits.
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out, and as I develop in the rest of this section, insider trading in a fully
Coasian firm presents major problems. Insider trading may be used as an
offensive weapon by the Coasian firm’s shareholders to expropriate out-
siders. It is no longer the case that shareholders internalize trading gains
and losses, and therefore no longer make choices reasonably in line with
social efficiency. Further, shareholder incentives (those of a seller of se-
curities) undercut the signaling value of insider trading. The absence of
agency costs seriously limits, if not eliminates, the social utility of insider
trading.
A. INSIDER TRADING AND THE EXPROPRIATION
OF OUTSIDE TRADERS
As in the Haddock & Macey set-up, suppose that there is some
probability at any given time that the firm experiences a material event in
which the value of the firm goes either up or down by a significant
amount. Such events could be a new business project, an earnings report,
a merger proposal, the realization of contingent obligations—any sort of
materially good or bad information. If the firm discloses the event, it is
instantly and efficiently priced by the market maker.18 Suppose further
that the manager learns of the information prior to its disclosure and has
the opportunity to undertake trades and make trading profits. What hap-
pens under our assumptions of a loyal manager who acts to benefit her
current shareholders?
It turns out that what will happen depends on whether the information
was positive or negative; the manager’s trading strategy will be asymmet-
ric. Before getting to that, though, consider the trading mechanics that
arise when the insider enters a trading order. In either case, the man-
ager’s trade passes through the market maker, who sets the bid-ask
spread to compensate for the expected value of expropriation by better-
informed traders, effectively passing the costs on to others.19 If the order
is a “buy” based on positive information, the market maker attempts to
match the manager’s buy with a corresponding sell order. If it is a “sell”
based on negative information, the market maker will attempt to match
with a buy order.
Take the positive information “buy” order case first. Who is going to be
the insider’s selling counterparty in such a case? The firm’s shares are
owned in their entirety by the firm’s shareholders. Thus, putting aside
18. This assumes that the information requires no special skill to process, which may
be largely true of information such as earnings reports and managers’ forecasts of earnings.
19. Either the market maker or the noise trader will directly bear the cost of expropri-
ation. If the price corrects before the market maker matches the informed order with a
noise order, the market maker bears the loss and vice-versa. The bid-ask spread accounts
for the market makers expected losses, effectively passing them on to the noise traders. See
Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of
Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 126 (2004).
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short sales by outsiders (which cannot be sustainable in the long run),20
the good news counterparty must be one or more of the firm’s sharehold-
ers. Shareholders bear the trading losses in this case and some portion
(though likely not all)21 of any illiquidity costs as well. However, the man-
ager’s trading profits are rebated to the shareholders via the compensa-
tion contract. The Haddock & Macey efficiency result largely obtains: the
bulk of costs and benefits are internalized onto the firm’s stakeholders,
and a well-governed firm would allow such trades only if they are
efficient.
Consider next the negative information case. If the manager’s informa-
tion is negative, the manager’s order will be a “sell,” and the market
maker matches the manager’s order with a corresponding buy order. A
purchaser of shares could be either an outsider looking to become a
shareholder or a shareholder seeking to purchase more shares. But over
time, shareholders must be net sellers (they, as a group, own the entire
firm, and any net sales of shares must come from them),22 and some posi-
tive portion of the insider’s sale of shares must, in expectation, be
matched with an outsider’s buy order. The incidence of the trading losses
must fall upon outsiders, at least partially, as will much of the liquidity
costs. The shareholders, however, enjoy the insider’s trading profits as
they are again rebated to shareholders via the compensation contract.
The shareholders enjoy a free lunch of sorts.
Troublingly, in this negative information case, the firm fails to internal-
ize the costs and benefits of insider trading. The efficiency result no
longer obtains—shareholders may choose to permit inefficient insider
selling, even though they would not have permitted inefficient insider
purchases. Overall, then, there is an asymmetry: the firm’s shareholders
will choose efficiently when the insider is buying (based on positive infor-
mation), but may not choose efficiently when the insider is selling (based
on negative information). We would expect to see, for instance, that
shareholders are at best indifferent to insider purchases (it is a wash for
them), but would be highly desirous of insider sales. Shareholders would,
accordingly, encourage insider selling.
What drives this result? The firm’s current shareholders own the entire
firm and are the ones who have the ability to control its corporate gov-
20. If outsiders can sell short, then the manager could be trading against an outsider in
this scenario. This would undermine the point that insider trading should be efficiently
constrained in the positive information case. There are reasons to think that short sales will
not play a significant role here, however. Short sales do eventually need to be covered;
short sales must generate an offsetting amount of real purchases over time. Unless we
believe that short-selling disproportionately occurs when undisclosed positive information
shocks occur (which seems unlikely to be the case), outsider purchases must generally
equal or exceed outsider shorts.
21. Shareholders would bear less than all liquidity costs since there may be other trad-
ing going on as well, which must pay the market maker’s spread. For instance, it could be
that the manager buys one share, a noise-trading shareholder sells two shares, and an out-
sider noise trader buys one share. Each trader would pay the spread; hence, a quarter of
the illiquidity costs are borne by the outsider.
22. See infra note 23.
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ernance, including whether the manager engages in insider trading. They
are the ones who strike the Coasian bargain with the manager and whose
interests the manager loyally serves. As owners, the shareholders also
stand in the position of prospective sellers. Whether or not some share-
holders add to their holdings, any net sales of the firm’s shares to outsid-
ers must come from the current shareholder group.23 As sellers,
shareholders do not like rules or practices that harm sellers, such as defla-
tion of the firm’s shares or sales at a bargain rate. Conversely, sharehold-
ers prefer seller-benefitting practices such as price inflation, generally,24
and in the context of insider trading, insider sales at inflated prices. This is
true even in the case where shareholders are heterogeneous—some
shareholders may be long-term holders, some may be short-term sellers,
and some may expect to acquire more shares—provided that sharehold-
ers and the manager can bargain among themselves to maximize their
joint welfare.25 When one adds up the payoff functions of these various
types of shareholders and aggregates them, what one ends up with is the
payoff function of a seller. In a well-governed firm, then, we should ex-
pect the firm to be managed so as to maximize the welfare of a share-
holder who has some expectation of selling his share—that is, with a pro-
seller bias.
A couple further observations are in order. One is that, in the fully
Coasian firm, insider trading should be large. Even if shareholders them-
selves cannot be made privy to the information, the shareholders would
be happy to provide the manager access to large volumes of stock that
she can sell in order to profit when the firm is over-valued. The manager’s
profits in excess of her reservation wage would be, as in the Haddock &
23. Some mathematics helps to illustrate the fact that current shareholders must be net
sellers of the firm’s securities. Suppose first that the firm’s shareholders are heterogeneous.
In such a case, each shareholder has the same probability of selling out their share over a
certain unit of time. Letting p denote the probability of selling out, each shareholder’s
expected payoff is pp + (1 - p)v, where p is the trading price received for selling out, and v
is the ultimate value received by holding onto the share. See James C. Spindler, Vicarious
Liability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong About 10b-5?, 13 AM. L. AND
ECON. REV. 359, 369–71 (2011) [hereinafter Spindler, Vicarious Liability].
With heterogeneous shareholders, aggregate incentives are, it turns out, the same as in
the homogeneous case. If we assume joint welfare maximization among the shareholders
(as the Coasian firm does), then the results are exactly the same, too. Suppose for simplic-
ity that there are three shareholders with contrasting time horizons: one who may sell, one
who may buy more, and one who will simply hold the firm’s shares. Their payoff functions
are, respectively: (1) US = pp + (1 – p)v; (2) UB = v + g(v - p); and (3) UH = v. The variable
g in the buyer-shareholder’s payoff function is the likelihood that the buyer-shareholder
will purchase an additional share in the future. So long as outside purchasers are expected
to purchase some shares of the firm, it must be the case that g < p. Summing up, we obtain
the joint welfare function of the firm’s initial shareholders: SUi = (p – g)p + (3 + g – p)v.
By substituting pz = (p – g)/3, we can rewrite the aggregate payoff function as SUi/3 = pzp +
(1 - pz)v. This is exactly the same form of payoff as the homogeneous shareholder case. See
James C. Spindler, Optimal Deterrence When Shareholders Desire Fraud, __ GEORGETOWN
L. J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10–11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3121230 [hereinafter Spindler, Optimal Deterrence].
24. See id. (showing that the firm’s current shareholders are net sellers and have
thereby a general preference for price-inflating misreporting).
25. See supra note 23.
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Macey model, rebated to the shareholders in the form of a lower wage.
Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that the manager’s wage would be nega-
tive: the volume of insider trading profits may dwarf the compensation
that the manager herself commands. Thus, rather than the relatively small
trades that characterize current insider trading cases (as exemplified by
prosecutions, at least),26 in a world of Coasian firms where insider trading
is not otherwise prohibited, insider trading would be enormous. It would
amount to, in essence, the ability of the shareholders themselves to sell
out on the basis of insider information, performed derivatively through
their loyal proxy, the manager.
Second, this analysis answers a question that a Coasian might otherwise
find vexing: why would shareholders ever choose to permit insider trad-
ing when one could, with the Coasian power to contract, simply replicate
the payoffs of insider trading via a compensation scheme? For instance, if
it is believed that in state-of-the-world A (“state A”), insider trading
would yield expected profits of $1, and that in state-of-the-world B
(“state B”), insider trading would yield expected profits of $2, one could
simply write a contract that pays the manager $1 in state A and $2 in state
B. This has the added salutary effect of reducing the risk that the man-
ager bears (Haddock & Macey assume that insider trading is inherently
risky—e.g., that the manager in state A would face 50/50 odds of $0 or $2
from insider trading). Instead of forcing the manager to bear whatever
her risky trading realization is, she enjoys the sum-certain of $1 in state A
and $2 in state B. The synthetic insider trading scheme is thus superior to
the authentic one, except for the fact that actual insider trading is likely
to be funded by outsiders. This would, of course, be the reason why
shareholders might prefer actual insider trading—from their ex post per-
spective, it amounts to a free lunch.
B. INSIDER TRADING FAILS AS A SIGNAL OF VALUE
What does this analysis say about the role of insider trading as a poten-
tial signaling device? One of the principal arguments in favor of insider
trading is that it serves as a credible signal of the firm’s value, where
credible disclosure is otherwise difficult or impossible to undertake. Such
signals contribute to price efficiency, which may have real economic ef-
fects by leading to more efficient capital allocation, better governance, or
the reduction of deadweight research and precaution costs. In the ab-
sence of meaningful antifraud rules, corporate disclosure may be viewed
simply as cheap talk. In contrast, when the insider puts her money where
her mouth is, markets may draw a stronger inference about her valuation
of the firm. Under such a narrative, the permission of insider trading
leads to greater price efficiency and/or lower illiquidity costs. Indeed,
26. Andrew R. Sorkin, Study Asserts Startling Numbers of Insider Trading Rogues,
CNBC MARKETS (Jun. 17, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/17/study-asserts-startling-
numbers-of-insider-trading-rogues.html [https://perma.cc/J47F-S3XS] (asserting that the
average insider trade was $1.6 million).
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there are entirely reasonable arguments that, in terms of market effects,
insider trading may be preferable to informed trading by outsiders.
Among other things, insiders may have better, cheaper information,
which saves on deadweight research costs, and it may be easier for mar-
ket participants to discern whether an insider is trading than whether an
informed market outsider is trading, leading to quicker and less costly
price discovery.27
Unfortunately, the assumption of a Coasian firm undercuts such a posi-
tive narrative. If we consider the incentives of shareholders, it turns out
that they may not in fact desire accurate signaling, and this can make it
difficult or impossible for insider trading to convey actual informational
content. The reasoning is similar to that explored above: shareholders, as
owners of the firm, have biased incentives with regard to price move-
ments. Current shareholders stand in the position of sellers of the firm’s
shares—they own all of it. Any net future sales must come from them and
the exercise by them of their control over the manager will take this into
account.
In particular, as sellers, we should expect that shareholders will gener-
ally desire price inflation and disdain price deflation. To the extent that
shareholders control the firm’s ability to send signals of value (as they
must in a firm without agency costs), the signals sent will reflect these
preferences. In particular, shareholders would direct the manager to
purchase shares in an attempt to artificially raise the price of the stock;
costs borne by the manager of this strategy are rebated back to her by the
shareholders. By artificially pushing the price higher, shareholders enjoy
higher trading profits as they sell their shares. The greater their propen-
sity to sell, the greater their potential profit, the less they are invested in
the firm’s long term prospects, and the more they would be willing to
invest in a false signal of positive value.28
In contrast, shareholders would generally not desire the manager to
signal negative information, even if it is true.29 Doing so would push the
price lower, and thus the greater the shareholders’ propensity to sell, the
greater their losses due to depressed short-term trading profits.
27. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866–72 (1983); Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model, supra note 8,
at 1452–55. As discussed above, such a result is debatable, and there are models that sug-
gest if insider traders are not subject to competition, price efficiency may decrease.
28. More formally, the shareholders’ representative payoff function is U = pp + (1-
p)v. See supra note 23. The greater the propensity to sell, p, the more weight is placed on
the short-term trading price, p, and the less weight is placed on the ultimate realization of
the firm’s production, v.
29. What about the possibility that the information will leak out into the market any-
ways? So long as the non-disclosure or non-correction can make the price distortion last
longer, the general effect is the same. The assumption of Coasianism eliminates the possi-
bility that the manager disloyally divulges the true information to the market. Informed
traders, on the other hand, may be able to replicate the information via their own research,
but perhaps less precisely and less quickly than would occur with disclosure. Even with
informational leakage, then, shareholders would desire that the manager not disclose, as
the greater period and amount of distortion benefits shareholders.
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So, in sum, the Coasian firm would engage in insider purchases to sig-
nal (falsely or not) positive information, and would not engage in insider
sales to signal negative information (whether or not negative information
has been obtained). How is this consistent with the result supra in Part
III.A, in which shareholders encourage insider sales, but are at best indif-
ferent to insider purchases? The preliminary answer is that it depends on
the anticipated strength of the signal of insider trading. If the signal value
is high, that militates toward more insider buying; if the signal value is
low, that means more insider selling.
Consider some out-of-equilibrium hypotheticals. At one extreme, if the
insider trading has no signaling value (that is, no amount of insider trad-
ing affects the price), shareholders would be happy to have the manager
sell overpriced shares to outsiders and in fact would direct the manager to
sell as much as possible, rebating the proceeds back to the shareholders
via the compensation contract. Shareholders would be indifferent to in-
sider purchases, since it nets out through the wage. At the other extreme,
if insider trading is taken as a highly credible signal (that is, insider trad-
ing of just one share has an immediate and significant effect on price),
shareholders would encourage the manager to purchase (a relatively
small amount of) shares to drive up the price, which enables shareholders
to sell off over time at inflated values.
Of course, in equilibrium, the signal’s credibility is endogenous: every-
one anticipates such dynamics, and neither extreme is likely to survive.
The game we are left with (remembering the assumption of no agency
costs) is simply that of an informed seller (the shareholders, acting
through their managerial proxy) and an uninformed buyer (the outside
market traders). Without the presence of noise trading or the ability to
undertake precautionary research, any offer to sell is a conclusive signal
of over-valuation. Offers from the seller to buy cannot really occur since
there does not exist an additional source for such purchases, as the seller
already owns all of the firm. In equilibrium, with only those players, the
market experiences extreme adverse selection, an instance of the no-
trade theorem in which no trading occurs, since any offer to trade signals
adverse information.30 With the presence of noise traders and the ability
for traders to research, some trade is possible at discounts, subject to li-
quidity costs and deadweight precautionary costs.31
30. See Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge,
26 J. OF ECON. THEORY 17, 17–27 (1982).
31. This is form of the standard trading problem enunciated by Glosten & Milgrom,
and Copeland & Galai. See Copeland & Galai, supra note 17, at 1468; Glosten & Milgrom,
supra note 17, at 72. Positive bid-ask spreads compensate market makers for the risk of
expropriation, and the informed trader’s profits (in this case, the seller’s) are funded in
expectation by noise traders.
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C. IS AN INSIDER TRADING BAN SOCIALLY PREFERABLE
WITH A FULLY COASIAN FIRM?
As the argument stands so far, the fully Coasian firm presents a prob-
lem for insider trading proponents. Because of current shareholders’ bi-
ased incentives, a loyal manager who acts to benefit current shareholders
would engage in insider trading in order to expropriate outsiders for the
benefit of shareholders. Adverse selection results with price discounts,
bid-ask spreads, and deadweight precaution costs. In such a case, would a
ban on insider trading make things better, or worse?
So far, the answer is not necessarily “yes” since there is a benefit to
insider trading in that uninformed, noise-trader investors will be more
willing to hold the firm’s shares. The insider acts as the current sharehold-
ers’ champion, protecting shareholders from expropriation by outside in-
formed traders. In terms of real economic effects, the costs of capital
formation may be lower, since noise investors are more willing to become
shareholders. The exact outcome depends on things such as the effect of
the insider trading on outside informed traders and the ability of the mar-
ket to distinguish informed trading from noise trading. In the best case,
looking again to Haddock & Macey, we could imagine that the insider
drives the informed traders from the market, taking their place; all then
proceeds as before. Under those circumstances, permitting insider trading
may well be preferable. Of course, other, less extreme scenarios may be
more likely, and coming to a definite conclusion, pro or con, may not be
possible.
However, a potentially decisive variable, not yet examined, is disclo-
sure. What effect does an insider trading ban have upon disclosure?
Should we hope that, by its nature, a “disclose or abstain from trading”
rule leads ineluctably to accurate and timely disclosure? Such disclosure,
if it is indeed forthcoming, would solve virtually all of the problems dis-
cussed above: market prices adjust rapidly—if not quite instantane-
ously—to disclosure, maximizing price efficiency and minimizing
illiquidity costs. This leaves little, if any, room for informed trading prof-
its (at least based on company information), whether by insiders or
outsiders.
Alas, the analysis presented here indicates that credible and timely dis-
closure faces the same sorts of problems as insider trading does because it
will not be freely forthcoming from a Coasian firm. Under a ban, it is true
that shareholders do benefit from accurate disclosure of positive informa-
tion. A loyal manager could protect the firm’s current shareholders from
expropriation by simply disclosing the positive information as it occurs
and before the outsider informed traders can discover it. Yet one must
also consider that shareholders benefit from positive disclosures gener-
ally—i.e., without regard to whether they are true. The Coasian manager
thus has incentives to lie since a lie allows shareholders to sell out at
inflated prices while it remains undiscovered. At the same time, share-
holders do not benefit from negative disclosure, whether or not such is
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true, since depressing the share price leads to lower shareholder payoffs
as they sell out. Absent some countervailing cost or liability for misstate-
ments or omissions,32 the equilibrium outcome is that the manager of the
Coasian firm will withhold negative information and falsely report posi-
tive information in order to maximize current shareholder welfare.
That said, if a credible disclosure regime can be imposed on the firm
(meaning that lying becomes an infeasible strategy),33 then it seems that
banning insider trading in advance of the disclosure will have unambigu-
ously good effects. The ban encourages voluntary disclosure of positive
information by the loyal manager; this protects shareholders against ex-
propriation by outsiders. Unfortunately, the same is not true for negative
information. If she can, the manager instead chooses to remain silent,
mimicking a no-event firm, attempting to buy time for her shareholders
to sell out.34 Even so, such an outcome is relatively good, and insider
trading would only make things worse: the firm’s shareholders are largely
protected from expropriation, and shareholder expropriation of outsiders
is limited.
D. AGENCY COSTS CAN MAKE INSIDER TRADING MORE VALUABLE
As described above, if there exists a credible disclosure system, the
case for banning insider trading in a world of Coasian firms is strong,
since the ban results in more disclosure, greater market efficiency, and
lower illiquidity costs. The potential benefits of insider trading—as an ef-
ficient incentive mechanism, as a defensive bulwark for small sharehold-
ers, and as a credible signal of value—are overshadowed, if not absent, in
a Coasian firm.
However, the fact that a ban may be optimal for a fully Coasian firm
does not mean that a ban is, in actuality, optimal. To the contrary, the
best case for insider trading is in a distinctly non-Coasian firm where sub-
stantial agency costs do exist. The existence of any form of agency cost is
not by itself sufficient, of course. For insider trading to fulfill its poten-
tially positive functions, one needs to explore exactly what the extent of
agency costs are and delineate the feasible bounds of contracting and
precommitment.
32. The consideration of optimal liability in such a situation is the focus of prior work.
See generally Spindler, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 23; Spindler, Vicarious Liability,
supra note 23.
33. For present purposes, such a regime could be either self-imposed through share-
holder precommitment or externally imposed as by a regulatory system of mandatory
disclosure.
34. The nondisclosing manager attempts to mimic a firm that has undergone no infor-
mation event. This assumes that disclosure of unchanged status—i.e., “no information
event has occurred”—is not feasible. If no-event disclosure is feasible, then we should ex-
pect complete unraveling (i.e., universal voluntary disclosure) in order to protect share-
holders from outside information traders who would otherwise buy the stock at a discount.
In such a case, the combination of an insider trading ban and voluntary credible disclosure
regime leads to a first-best outcome.
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Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper (“Coasian firm” is in
the title, after all), but we could take a speculative stab at what some
sufficient conditions might begin to look like. Suppose the compensation
contract is observable and not subject to renegotiation; this prevents the
shareholders and managers teaming up to manipulate the signal or to en-
gage in insider-trading-by-proxy. Suppose also the manager is subject to
some liquidity limitations, meaning that her trades cannot be arbitrarily
large; this prevents the total expropriation of other parties (whether it be
shareholders or outsiders) so that they are still willing to play the game.
In such a situation, the manager’s trading, based on maximizing her own
self-interest, may provide a useful signal and manageable incentive de-
vice. For instance, suppose a somewhat disloyal manager comes to learn
positive information. Disclosure may be a poor option: perhaps she is
viewed as not credible (she might lie in an attempt to save her job or
otherwise increase her compensation), or perhaps she does not want to
disclose for fear of personal liability. Instead, she purchases some shares,
placing her own money on the line, to benefit herself. The purchases, ob-
served by the market maker, have the salutary effect of signaling the posi-
tive information to the marketplace. Even though the purchases, ex post,
come at the expense of current shareholders, the shareholders of the non-
Coasian firm, in this case, may well prefer the insider trading to occur
since it protects them from further expropriation by outside information
traders.35
This example, though it seems reasonable, assumes some things that
need to be explained. In particular, why can the shareholders not bribe
the manager to send a false trading signal? Why must we rely on trading
as a signal and not on disclosure? Beyond simply assuming them to be the
case, there must be fundamental limitations on shareholders’ ability to
contract with the manager and limitations on the ability to renegotiate
that contract. The trick is that such limitations need to not only make
insider trading work but also be necessary. Consider the problem: if
shareholders could write a detailed, public, non-renegotiable algorithm
that controls the manager (perhaps putting it in the corporate charter),
then the algorithm could provide that the manager will only buy or sell a
certain amount of securities in certain circumstances. Certainly, insider
trading would be a credible signal in such a case. The problem is that this
hypothetical proves too much: if shareholders can write such detailed al-
gorithms of managerial behavior, why can they not simply provide for
disclosure in such circumstances? It must be at least as credible as the
insider trading itself,36 and one cannot readily justify insider trading
35. The same would not be true of insider selling, however.
36. The argument has been made that the firm may not wish to give away its secrets,
but disclosure need not do this. The manager could disclose, “Our value has gone up,” or,
to be even more detailed, she could say, “Our value has gone up by $5 per share.” If the
algorithm is credible, then this should suffice. There is no need to say, “We have prelimina-
rily discovered $5 per share worth of valuable mineral deposits at the following latitude
and longitude,” thus spilling the firm’s beans.
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under such assumptions.
In the real world, of course, perfect contracting is not possible. The
inability of robots to do the job of the manager implies that the discretion
and judgment of actual human beings, as opposed to some contractual
algorithm, is (as yet) required to run the modern firm. Similarly, precom-
mitment to a set compensation scheme appears to be highly limited in
practice, though for reasons that are harder to divine. The average com-
pensation scheme of a large, publicly traded corporation allows for dis-
cretion and renegotiation. The board can always choose to pay the
manager more, true up her options, or renew or fire her after her term is
up, and the manager herself is always free to quit (depending on the ex-
tent to which non-competes and liquidated damages are enforced). Firms,
for their part, do not precommit to not sell overvalued equity, to not ac-
cept buyout offers at too high a price, nor to buy back underpriced eq-
uity. Precommitment could clearly be valuable, at least in these
theoretical models, but why do we not see more of it in practice?
In any event, more work along these lines is needed. For the time be-
ing, however, the analysis here shows that the absence of agency costs
raises serious problems for insider trading. The addition of agency costs
may make insider trading less harmful and more beneficial than the Coa-
sian model allows. An interesting insight is that agency costs are not al-
ways bad; shareholders themselves have some bad incentives that agency
costs may constrain. This is a broad point, one that encompasses corpo-
rate activities beyond just insider trading. It implies that instead of con-
cocting increasingly draconian schemes to combat agency costs, the
question that corporate and securities law scholars should address is a
more nuanced one: what are the parameters of agency costs within the
firm given contracting technology, and what role does that leave, or not,
for regulatory intervention?
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT USEFUL INSIGHTS DOES THE
NO-AGENCY COST MODEL PROVIDE?
This article has expanded the Haddock & Macey model to show that
insider trading is problematic under assumptions of a Coasian firm (that
is, a firm without agency costs). Insider trading becomes a tool by which
shareholders may utilize the manager’s informational advantage to ex-
propriate outsiders. The potential market benefit of insider trading—
greater price efficiency—fails to hold up as shareholders would, via their
managerial proxy, use any signaling content of insider trading to manipu-
late the signal to their own advantage by inflating prices.
What does this highly theoretical model have to tell us? Several things,
hopefully. First, there is a prescription for securities law scholarship: an
analysis of a firm’s capital markets behavior, including disclosure and
trading, must take into account the firm’s governance and the incentives
of shareholders themselves. There has been a tendency to assume that,
were it not for disloyal managers, all would be right with our capital mar-
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kets. The analysis here shows that this is not the case;37 shareholders
themselves have impure motives. Unfortunately, despite Haddock & Ma-
cey’s example from three decades ago, there has been relatively little
work (particularly formal work) in the securities law literature that at-
tempts to integrate governance and capital markets behavior in a rigor-
ous way.
Second, we should bear in mind that corporate agency costs are ambig-
uous in any consideration of social welfare. That is, if shareholders are
inclined to do some bad things, eliminating agency costs would not neces-
sarily improve the world. This is not a new point,38 although, perhaps
since Enron, scholarship has lost sight of it in favor of degenerate man-
ager narratives. But more germane to the instant inquiry, and more
novel, is the insight that the reduction of firm agency costs will not neces-
sarily improve either corporate disclosure or the capital markets in which
their securities trade. I have shown this with regard to reporting behavior
in other work,39 and as shown here, it is difficult to see insider trading
fulfilling a useful role in a Coasian firm.
Third, to the extent we need legal rules against fraud and manipulative
behavior, those rules (and the penalties thereunder) must recognize the
magnitude of the incentives at play. If shareholders allow or encourage
insider trading because it benefits them, then in terms of magnitude, the
requisite deterrent penalties must be shareholder-sized, instead of man-
ager-sized. In other words, they will have to be large. Shareholders of a
firm with a $10 billion market capitalization reasonably have incentives
properly counted in the billions, whether it be to grow the firm (presuma-
bly good) or inflate its price (presumably bad) or expropriate outsiders
(also presumably bad).
Consider a final puzzle that illustrates these points: shareholders pay
the manager a relatively short-term, performance-based bonus worth up
to $10 million that encourages both productive effort and, sadly, manipu-
lation of the firm’s stock price. The manager withholds information and
undertakes a series of trades that do, in fact, push the price higher for
some time. This garners benefits to shareholders who partially sell off
before the price corrects. Let us say the selling shareholders gain $100
million; the manager herself makes a small trading profit of $100,000. The
question is: what is the right deterrent penalty, and on whom is it best
placed? The amount of the manager’s trading profits is clearly too small.
Looking to the compensation contract delivers a bigger number, but if we
fine the manager, say, $10 million, the shareholders might simply raise
the performance bonus to $20 million and so on. Indeed, until the fine
gets to the level of the shareholders’ trading gains ($100 million), it is not
37. See also Spindler, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 23; James C. Spindler, Vicarious
Liability for Managerial Myopia, 46 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 161, 161–63 (2017) [hereinafter
Spindler, Managerial Myopia]; Spindler, Vicarious Liability supra note 23.
38. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11.
39. See Spindler, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 23; Spindler, Managerial Myopia,
supra note 37.
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certain that the manipulative conduct would be deterred. With regard to
who should bear the fine, placing liability of such magnitude on the man-
ager is problematic; rather, the size of the requisite penalty may militate
in favor of vicarious liability.
In closing, there is much that a Coasian model of the firm and its capi-
tal markets activity can tell us. Managers may not be the problem; share-
holders themselves are not angels. While the truly Coasian firm is a
theoretical construct, shareholders and their firms are well-incentivized to
solve agency cost problems. To the extent they do so, we may encounter
worse, rather than better, corporate behavior.
